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Abstract 
The paper investigates the consequences of interactions between autonomy, intra and inter-organizational 
networks for the performance of subsidiaries. Furthermore, the paper analyzes the impact of changes in 
autonomy and network relationships rather than investigating levels. This introduces the concept of 
adjustment of subsidiary strategies to changes in the international and host country business environment. 
Based on a survey of 350 foreign owned subsidiaries located in the UK, Germany and Denmark, we find 
evidence that increases in the inter-organizational network relationships of subsidiaries lead to increased 
subsidiary performance. Further, increased subsidiary autonomy positively affects subsidiary inter-
organizational network relationships, and to some degree negatively affects intra-organizational network 
relationships. Finally, overlapping effects between inter- and intra-organizational network relationships are 
found. 
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1.0 Introduction 
The pressures of globalization are likely to call for changed organizational structures and strategies of the 
multinational corporation (MNC) (Buckley, 2009). From the subsidiary point of view, the question is how to 
most effectively integrate operations into the local host country environment, and simultaneously to 
benefit from being part of the MNC network (Holm, Holmström, & Sharma, 2005). This paper contributes 
by adding the element of subsidiary autonomy to this question (Young & Tavares, 2004). The paper 
therefore investigates the consequences of interactions between autonomy, intra and inter-organizational 
networks for the performance of subsidiaries. Furthermore, the paper analyzes the impact of changes in 
autonomy and network relationships rather than investigating levels. This introduces the concept of 
adjustment of subsidiary strategies to changes in the international and host country business 
environments.  
A number of studies have investigated autonomy and network relationships of subsidiaries and their 
influence on performance. However, these studies do not present an integrated framework of how 
subsidiary autonomy and inter-organizational and intra-organizational relationships affects subsidiary 
performance. To exemplify, Vernaik, Midgley, & Devinney (2005) survey how inter-unit networking and 
subsidiary autonomy independently affects subsidiary performance, but excludes the effects of external 
networks. Andersson, Forsgren, & Holm (2007) investigate subsidiary influence in the federative MNC, but 
it leaves out the factor of autonomy.  Likewise the survey by Andersson, Björkman, Forsgren (2005) 
investigating the relation between subsidiary knowledge creation and control. Other subsidiary 
performance-oriented surveys either treats performance as an independent variable (Lovett, Pérez-
Nordtvedt, & Rasheed, 2009) or focus on other issues such as psychic distance (Dikova, 2009). Surveys 
focusing on network relationships tend to investigate local spillover effects (Duanmu & Fai, 2007; Giroud, 
2007). One survey, though, analyzes the relation between networks, autonomy and performance, but 
builds their investigation on a limited number of cases (Birkinshaw, Hood, & Young, 2005). 
This paper also responds to the call from Giroud and Scott-Kennel (2009) to expand studies on the intensity 
of MNC linkages. In their paper they develop a framework of MNC linkage intensity based on the, scope, 
quantity and quality of these linkages. In our paper, we both identify the intensity of quantity, by 
considering the number and frequency of linkages, the scope of linkages by investigating various actors of 
the network, and the quality results from linkages by including a performance variable.  
The paper uses network views on subsidiary organizational strategies to derive six hypotheses on the links 
between autonomy, inter and intra-organizational network relationships and performance. This leads to 
the methodology section describing the sample and the constructs. A section on the empirical analyses 
leads to discussion of the results and a conclusion.  
2.0 Inter- and intra-organizational network relationships  
Increased inter- and intra-organizational network relationships positively affect subsidiary performance 
(Birkinshaw et al., 2005). The combined use, in this paper, of the terms ‘network’ and ‘relationships’ 
addresses the two  important elements in MNC linkages, which are based on reciprocal and interdependent 
task-related activities that are performed given a certain constellation of resources among a number of 
players in a specific context (Ghoshal & Bartlett, 2005). ‘Network’ defines the actors with which the 
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subsidiary establishes relationships. Intra-organizational networks consist of the parent company and other 
subsidiaries of the MNC. Inter-organizational networks comprises actors outside the boundaries of the 
MNC such as domestic or international business entities such as customers, suppliers, competitors as well 
as non-business entities like universities, and other supporting agencies  governmental, quasi-
governmental  and non-governmental agencies (Giroud & Scott-Kennel, 2009). Relationships refer to the 
interaction between the subsidiary and network partners including linkages and transactions between 
these partners. These relationships cover both the backwards linkages and transactions (such as supply and 
logistics), forward linkages and transactions (such as distribution and sales), and collaborative linkages 
(such as strategic alliances with competitors and collaborations to boost innovation) of the subsidiary 
(Giroud & Scott-Kennel, 2009), which is carried out within an intra- and inter-organizational network 
(Jindra, Giroud, & Scott-Kennel, 2009).  
2.1 Subsidiary inter-organizational network relationships 
A high level of intensity in inter-organizational network relationships is associated positively to 
performance because of the value attached to locating within local networks to develop international 
competitiveness (Porter, 1994) and utilize localization advantages (Dunning, 2009). Obtaining such higher 
value activities in many cases is based on learning and innovation benefits (Frost, 2001) and 
entrepreneurial activities (Birkinshaw et al., 2005; Jindra et al., 2009). Research suggests that innovation 
and entrepreneurial activities enhances performance by increasing the number of partner firms, and by 
increasing the diversity of network relationships (Powell, Koput, & Smith-Doerr, 1996). Further, increasing 
local network intensity exposes the subsidiary to multiple sources of  valuable assets available in the host  
environment and thereby increases the likelihood of tapping into such sources (Mu, Gnyawali, & Hatfield, 
2007), especially in cases where knowledge is tacit or requires trust-based relationships to be grasped 
effectively (Madhavan & Iriyama, 2009).  
The benefits of tapping into networks imply that high levels of inter-organizational network relationships 
are positively associated to subsidiary performance.  The effect however of increasing such network 
relationships is not unambiguous. An ever increasing level of intra-organizational network relationships 
may not always lead to increased subsidiary performance. Nevertheless, newly established greenfield 
subsidiaries often have low levels of inter-organizational network relationships and are disadvantaged 
compared to local firms and most foreign owned subsidiaries suffer from liability of foreigness (Zaheer, 
1995). Therefore, Saggi (2002) suggests that foreign firms typically must generate more external linkages 
than local firms to secure benefits. Moreover, in constantly changing environments are likely to require 
subsidiaries to develop inter-organizational network relationships. Increasing inter-organizational network 
relationships bring power to the subsidiary (Andersson et al., 2007), as an outcome of other MNC units’ 
resource dependency on the subsidiary (Bouquet & Birkinshaw, 2008), and decreased uncertainty of 
further parent company investment into the subsidiary (Astley & Sachdeva, 1984). Subsidiaries that focus 
more on R&D and related activies (Manea & Pearce, 2006) are likely to suffer from the resource constraints 
that derive from innovation (Abernathy & Clark, 1985). Such firms are likely to establish strategic 
collaboration with other firms (Teng, 2007). On average increased inter-organizational network 
relationships is predicted to generate positive subsidiary performance. This argumentation leads to the first 
hypothesis: 
H1: Increases in inter-organizational network relationships increase subsidiary performance 
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2.2 Subsidiary Intra-organizational Network Relationships 
Intra-organizational network relationships have been found to be positively associated to subsidiary 
performance (Vernaik et al., 2005), as these network relationships boost learning processes and stimulate 
subsidiary’s entrepreneurial efforts (Gnyawali, Singal, & Mu, 2009). In particular, the network relationship 
to the parent company is highly valuable (Birkinshaw & Hood, 1998) for example knowledge exchanges 
with parent company positively affects innovation and performance (Monteiro, Arvidsson, & Birkinshaw, 
2008). Further, the extent of the parental international network is important for the subsidiary’s ability to 
establish its own international network (Elango & Pattnaik, 2007). The parental network provides the 
subsidiary with important connections, and lowers transaction cost. Furthermore, Gnyawali et al. (2009) 
argue that the network relationship to the parent company is also decisive for the underperforming 
subsidiary, as this network relationship reduces the subsidiary’s strategic vulnerability. Luo (2003) argues 
that parental support reduces the subsidiary’s dependencies of resources located in the host country, and 
thereby it reduces the uncertainty of subsidiary operations.  
Increased support from the parent company is therefore relevant to the subsidiary with low embeddedness 
with the parent. Highly embedded subsidiary also benefits from further increases in network relationships, 
as they are likely to put the subsidiary into a more central position in the intra-organizational network 
(Ghoshal & Bartlett, 2005). Centrally positioned subsidiaries control value chain operations (Astley & Zajac, 
1991) or the access to critical resources in the host country. In this situation, the subsidiary is found to be 
powerful (Forsgren, Holm, & Johanson, 2005). Hence on average increased intra-organizational network 
relationships  enhances the likelihood of the subsidiary’s ability to influence the behavior of the parent 
company’s strategic decision making behavior being in favour of the subsidiary, and therefore, positively 
associate to performance. This leads to the second hypothesis:  
H2:  Increases of the intra-organizational network relationships increase subsidiary performance 
2.3 Subsidiary inter-organizational and intra-organizational network 
relationships 
Changes in both intra- and inter-organizational network relationships are proposed to positively influence 
subsidiary performance. However, the question is whether the subsidiary operates in two distinct 
networks, or as argued by Wang, Liu, & Li (2009) that there are interdependencies between the two 
networks. The impact of subsidiary external network relationships on power distribution and capability 
development within the MNC indicates that both inter- and intra-organizational network relationships help 
to enhance subsidiary performance (Andersson, Forsgren, & Holm, 2002, Andersson et al., 2007; Garcia-
Pont, Canales, & Noboa, 2009).  However, a remaining question is whether the intensity of one type of 
network relationships also facilitates an extension of the other type of network relationships thereby 
affecting performance. These aspects are discussed by Forsgren, Hägg, Håkansson, Johanson, & Mattsson, 
1995) who note that the use of one firm’s assets (e.g., parent company) depends on the use of another 
firm’s (a local firm) assets. The subsidiary becomes the link and coordinating entity in a network of inter- 
and intra-organizational actors. Garcia-Pont et al. (2009: 184) posit: ‘that subsidiaries can proactively define 
their strategy in both environments’. The interdependencies of the two networks are the explanatory 
factor. The concept of an overlapping network encapsulates the situation where some actors in one 
network are related to actors in another network. Mattsson (1998) speaks of actor-based overlapping in 
which strategic actions increases the extension of the network (i.e., the number of overlapping actors). 
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According to Mattsson (p. 246-247) an overlap: ‘stimulates innovation and increases opportunities to 
coordinate extended production systems for increased efficiency’. Mattsson, further, predicts that an 
overlap between internal and external networks is central in explaining increases in the international 
integration of the subsidiary. These arguments lead to the third hypothesis: 
H3: Increases in inter-organizational network relationships increase intra-organizational network 
relationships  
2.4 Subsidiary autonomy and performance 
The degree to which a subsidiary can establish or extend its network relationships depends on the degree 
of autonomy granted to the subsidiary. In this paper, autonomy refers to an organization “in which units 
and sub-units possess the ability to take decisions for themselves on issues which are reserved to a higher 
level in comparable organizations” (Brooke, 1984: 9).  Autonomy is often associated to performance 
because autonomy seems to correlate with the most advanced subsidiary roles (Birkinshaw & Morrison, 
1995; Enright & Subramanian, 2007; White & Poynter, 1984). Autonomy has further been associated to 
subsidiary entrepreneurship (Boehe, 2007) that permits a degree of freedom to engage in a variety of both 
intra- and inter-organizational network linkages and transactions that can involve a multitude of possible 
strategic and operational areas and a large number of possible outcomes. A virtuous circle effect, whereby 
increased subsidiary performance leads to increased autonomy that emphasizes the links between 
subsidiary autonomy and performance. Subsidiaries that have a low degree of autonomy will therefore 
benefit from increased autonomy whereas high autonomous subsidiaries are likely to develop into 
advanced subsidiary roles such as centres of excellences that require increased autonomy (Frost, 
Birkinshaw, & Ensign, 2002). This leads to the fourth hypothesis: 
Hypothesis 4: Increases in the autonomy of the subsidiary increase subsidiary performance 
2.5 Subsidiary autonomy and inter-organizational network relationships 
Subsidiary flexibility helps management to more successfully establish and deal with beneficial inter-
organisational network relationships because of a decreased need to obtain approval from the parent 
company (Birkinshaw et al. 2005). This is especially the case when operating in networks where not only 
the relationship to a client (customer/supplier etc.) is important, but the client’s relationships to its 
suppliers, customers and competitors are critical resources of the subsidiary (Lindstrand, Eriksson, & 
Sharma, 2009). Increased autonomy is, therefore, suggested to increase the quantity, the scope, and the 
quality of the subsidiary network (Giroud & Scott-Kennel, 2009). The latter refers to the autonomy and 
subsidiary entrepreneurial connection. Here Jindra et al. (2009) find support for the connection between 
subsidiary autonomy and network intensity, though not in the case of product developments.  
In general, increases in autonomy, both from a low and a high level, help the subsidiary to enlarge the 
scope, quantity and quality of their inter-organizational network relationships. Even though  a subsidiary 
can only manage a certain number of network relationships, and a further increase in a high level of 
autonomy will not necessarily  lead to increases in inter-organizational network relationships, the 
subsidiary will still be able to develop more intense network relationships, and thereby benefit from the 
‘client’s relationship to other clients’.  Hypothesis 5 reflects this view:   
H5: Increases in subsidiary autonomy increases inter-organizational network relationships of the subsidiary. 
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2.6 Subsidiary autonomy and intra-organizational network relationship 
A counterargument to the above analysis states that changes in subsidiary autonomy are likely to lead to a 
decrease in intra-organizational network relationships. The primary reason is that subsidiary autonomy by 
nature is likely to disassociate the subsidiary from other units in the organization. Thus, studies indicate 
that subsidiary autonomy has a negative effect on intra-organizational knowledge sharing. Noorderhaven & 
Harzing (2009) find that subsidiary autonomy leads to ‘stand alone activities’, which implies less social 
interaction between the subsidiary’ employees and other MNC staff members. Another argument is that 
autonomous subsidiaries will have a tendency to become ‘peripheral’ or ‘isolated’ from interactions within 
the MNC. The in- and outflows of knowledge from such entities has proven to be limited, which indicates 
negative performance effects (Monteiro et al., 2008). A third argument derives from the concept of 
overembededness where autonomy leads to the development of a few and very strong inter-organizational 
network relationships, this might ‘blind’ the subsidiary from other important developments (Mu et al., 
2007; Uzzi, 1997). This line of reasoning leads to the final hypothesis:  
H6: Increases in subsidiary autonomy decrease the intra-organizational network relationships of the 
subsidiary. 
3.0 Methodology 
To test the hypotheses a survey of foreign owned subsidiaries located in the UK, Germany and Denmark 
was undertaken following Tung & Witteloostuijn’s (2008) recommendation of surveying international 
business themes using a comparative sample.  A self-administrated questionnaire sent to subsidiary 
managers provided data to test the hypotheses. An initial survey format, written in English, developed 
using a literature review of former surveys in this area was translated into Danish and German by native-
speaking members of the research group. Pilot tests of the questionnaire in nine subsidiaries, three Danish, 
German and United Kingdom based subsidiaries provided information to improve the questionnaire. In the 
first mailing, a cover letter and a 4 paged questionnaire went to the subsidiary manager in establishments 
in Denmark, Germany and the UK, followed by a reminder for those subsidiaries that did not respond. In 
the Danish case, information from the CD-direct database contained information on every establishment in 
Denmark. According to this database, at the time of investigation there were 2,996 foreign owned 
establishments in Denmark. However, 1,187 of those establishments were holding type of units (with zero 
or one employee) or operating within real estate. The questionnaire  to 1,809 subsidiaries, excluding 32 
subsidiaries that returned the questionnaire because of non-applicability, and 120 subsidiaries being 
returned by postal service as undeliverable, the sample size was therefore reduced to 1,657. Of these 249 
usable questionnaires were returned, producing a response rate at 15 percent. In the German case, the 
postal survey resulted in 124 returns. In this case the sample size of randomly selected 3000 foreign owned 
subsidiaries with 550 non identifiable addresses, 18 companies did not exist anymore, and 14 companies 
responded that they did not have any foreign ownership. In United Kingdom, we had 155 responses. Again, 
wrong addresses and a substantial part of holding companies reduced the original sample to 1509. We, 
therefore, pass the acceptable level of response rate for international surveys (Harzing, 1997). Missing 
values reduced the useable returns to 350. A non-response bias test using a MANOVA framework, testing 
differences between the first call and reminders showed no effects.  
 Table 1 presents descriptive statistics of the sample. Germany is the main investor with other European 
countries providing the bulk of the ownership of the subsidiaries. Most investments come from neighboring 
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countries. On average the subsidiaries have been established with activities in host country for decades. 
They are therefore now medium sized and have extensive international activities. Given their age, it is not 
surprising that most of them are greenfield establishments. Their age might explain the high proportion of 
them that are managed by host country managers.  
3.1 Testing techniques 
This survey adopts a partial least squares (PLS) approach to structural equation modeling. PLS modeling is 
used in subsidiary research by for example Vernaik et al., (2005), Money & Graham (1999), and Fey, 
Morgulis-Yakushev, Park, & Björkman (2009) and in related areas, such as international joint ventures 
(Inkpen & Birkinshaw, 1994). This technique based on structural equation model can, compared to the 
Lisrel and AMOS techniques be used to test smaller samples. Moreover, PLS models operates with two sets 
of linear equations, an inner model that specifies relationships between latent variables, and an outer 
model analyzing relationships between the latent variables and associated manifest variables. This permits 
simultaneously analysis of the path coefficients between latent variables, and the path coefficients 
between these variables and their constructs (measurements) (Fey at al., 2009). This provides an 
assessment of the reliability and validity of the measurement model, followed by an assessment of the 
structural model (Hulland, 1999). Further, as Vernaik et al., (2005) indicate, since models and measures in 
international business are still in  initial stages of development, the regression based approach is  more 
appropriate than covariance-based methods like LISREL. Finally, PLS method is robust against inadequacies 
such as skewed distribution of manifest variables, multi-collinearity within blocks of manifest and between 
latent variables, and omission of regressions (Cassel, Hackl, & Westlund, 1999). By using SmartPLS 2.0, we 
generate t-statistics by bootstrapping procedures. This technique makes the result more reliable as it uses 
repeated random samples (Vernaik et al., 2005). Further, we calculate total effects. This is advantageous 
since in includes both direct and indirect effects (Sönke, 2010).  
Chang, Witteloostuijin, & Eden (2010) address the problem of common method variance (CMV) which is 
likely to occur in self-reported questionnaire surveys where the same respondent provides information for 
both dependent and independent variables. This survey is of this kind but the respondents reported on 
measures ‘five years ago’ and ‘currently’ thereby allowing use a change variable that reduces the likelihood 
of CMV. Further, as suggested by Podsakoff & Organ (1986), the reporting on discrete event reduces the 
likelihood of CMV thus in the questionnaire the number and frequency of relationships was sought. 
Furthermore, the questions relating to performance appeared before questions related to relationships and 
autonomy. This order reduces the likelihood of the respondent estimating for example good performance 
as an outcome of high levels of relationships. Complexity of the PLS technique further reduces the 
likelihood CMV (Chang et al., 2010). The Harman's one-factor test results are satisfactory, using a Principal 
Component Analysis, where first eigenvalue counts for 25% of the variance and 6 eigenvalues are above 1.  
3.2 Construct and Measures 
The model has four main constructs – ‘subsidiary autonomy’, ‘inter-organizational network relationships’, 
‘intra-organizational network relationships’, and ‘subsidiary performance’. All four constructs are based on 
changes during a five-year period. The measurements for each construct are shown in Figure 1. 
Measurements are adapted from Taggart & Hood (1999), Holm & Pedersen (2000), and Birkinshaw et al., 
(2005). To capture rich data, the constructs come from multiple questionnaire items using five-point Likert 
scales. All constructs are based on self-reports and therefore include subjective (non-financial) measures. 
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This may be subject to bias, however, this method is widely used in literature, and in general there is 
evidence of general reliability (Venkatraman & Ramanujam, 1986). In relation to measuring performance of 
MNC operations, problems exist in relation to its multi-faceted nature of performances (Glaister & Buckley, 
1999; Gong, Shenkar, Luo; & Nyaw, 2005; Miller, Lee, Chang, & Le Betron-Miller, 2009). Thus subsidiary 
performance is defined as a single measure to gauge overall performance and to provide a rounded view of 
subsidiary performance. There are also well documented problems of collecting accurate and valid 
performance measures using questionnaires (Luo, 2007). However, management’s strategic thinking and 
actions guides their perception of company performance rather than solely by objective performance 
indicators, and it is the perception of facts and not facts themselves that management is likely to act upon 
(Thompson, 2003). In addition, at subsidiary level many objective indicators, especially financial ones, are 
suspect because of the reporting arrangements of MNCs (Guest, Michie, Conway, & Sheehan, 2003). Due to 
reservations with similar studies objective measures of performance were not included in the questionnaire 
(Demirbag, Tatoglu; Glaiser, 2007).  Figure 1 illustrates the tested model. 
--------------------- 
Figure 1 about here 
--------------------- 
Control variables are (a) host country, (b) home country, (c) size (number of employees), (d) industry (each 
entity’s main activity classified in relation to NACE code and divided into either the high-tech, medium-tech 
or low-tech category, and (e) entry mode (greenfield, joint venture, acquisition). This type of control 
variables has been used in other PLS test like Fey et al., (2009) 
4.0 Analysis/Results 
The results of the PLS test are reported in Table 3. Composite reliabilities, Cronbach alpha values, and R-
squares are shown in Table 2. Goodness-of-Fit is 0.996, and Standardized Root Mean Square Residual is 
0.080. 
Table 3 and Table 2 around here 
Hypothesis 1 suggested a positive relationship between increases in inter-organizational network 
relationships and increases in subsidiary performance, and this is the case with or without controls. There is 
no support for hypothesis 2 suggesting that a positive relationship between increases in intra-
organizational network relationship and performance exist. However, there is a significant relationship 
without the controls. There is support for the overlapping network effect thus verifying hypothesis 3. 
Furthermore, there is a positive and a significant link between increased autonomy and increased 
performance but the controls affect this result, leading to partial support for hypothesis 4. There is a strong 
support for hypothesis 5, the relationship between autonomy and inter-organizational network 
relationships. Finally, without controls we find a significant and negative relationship between autonomy 
and intra-organizational network relationships. 
The controls affect the triangle of intra-organizational network relationships, autonomy, and their relations 
to performance. Using a Multivariate Analysis of Variance in a two step procedure reveals that there are no 
host country and industry effects. However, home country, size, and entry mode affects the result. These 
three factors facilitate intra-organizational network relationships leading to improved performance. 
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However, control variables worsen the negative effect of autonomy on intra-organizational network 
relationships. As we report total effects, this negative relation affects the links between autonomy and 
performance, making this relationship non-significant.   
To test the robustness of data analysis, we ran a Generalized Structured Component Analysis on the same 
data set.  Here we reach similar results, despite that estimation methodology and procedures are different. 
Finally we tested the causal relationships between factors. In our main model we assume that autonomy 
affects network relationships, and that inter-organizational network relationships affect intra-
organizational network relationship. An alternative model, where intra-organizational network 
relationships affect inter-organizational network relationships shows similar path-correlations; however, 
this model is weak showing lower R-squares. Another alternative model testing how network relationships 
affect autonomy produces same path correlations and similar R-squares as the main model. 
5.0 Conclusions and discussions 
This paper demonstrates a need for further investigation of the interdependencies among subsidiary 
autonomy and the intra- and inter-organizational network relationships of the subsidiary. The results imply, 
for both parent company management and subsidiary management, a need to coordinate strategies so all 
three factors are managed simultaneously instead of having an individual focus on one of the factors. The 
causal relationships between the three factors, we suggest, to be researched through qualitative surveys. 
However, based on the strong and significant results, the inter-organizational network relationships seem 
to be of high importance, and direct strong performance effects are likely to occur from increases in these 
network relationships. However, managers must be aware that autonomy is a double-edged sword. It is 
only in some cases that direct performance effects will result from expanding autonomy, thus increased 
autonomy may enhance the likelihood of putting the subsidiary into a peripheral position in the intra-
organizational network. Another managerial implication must be that in case of resource constraints, the 
external links of the subsidiary seemingly leads to a higher payoff that supporting the internal links.  
The survey tests the taxonomy by Giroud and Scott-Kennel (2009) as it points at how the quantity of 
network relationships (number and frequency of transactions) combined with the scope of network 
relationships (number of internal and external actors) affects subsidiary performance (the quality of 
network relationships).  The study investigates the interactions between these factors, and it adds the 
factor of autonomy. These interactions effects are worthy of further investigation; for example the 
overlapping effects between inter- and intra-organizational networks. However, autonomy presents a 
complex problem as it simultaneously smoothens the flexibility of the subsidiary to operate in host country 
environment, but is likely to leave the subsidiary in a peripheral organizational position within the MNC. 
The change aspect is, therefore, of high managerial importance. A best solution might be that increases of 
some factors simultaneously creates a need for a decrease of other elements, for example a simultaneously 
increase in autonomy of inter-organizational network relationships and decreased autonomy of intra-
organizational network relationships.   
The results are limited due to the sample and the conceptual focus on network theory. Naturally, the 
results in most cases refer to Western European investment into nearby developed countries. Even though 
the three host countries represent a cross-institutional setting (Fenton-O’Creevy, Gooderham, & Nordhaug, 
2008), and a variation into country size (Gammelgaard, McDonald, Tüselmann, Dörrenbächer, & Stephan, 
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2009), the conclusions that can be drawn are still limited.  Future research to improve our understanding 
are require on issues such as  the economic strength and comparative factor endowments of the host 
country (Kogut, 1985) and the value chain distribution in relation to location (Mudambi, 2008). From a 
conceptual point of view, the focus on network theory excludes factors that typically are explained by other 
theories of the firm such as absorptive capacities (resource-based view), internal coordinating cost and 
entry mode decisions (transaction costs) and legitimacy and cultural and regulative aspects (institutional 
theory). On the other hand, useful generic results emerge from this survey. It confirms the finding of 
Birkinshaw et al. (2005) where subsidiaries with a high degree of autonomy and an external focus, or a 
combined internal and external focus, where slightly better performing. This survey further confirms the 
findings by Vernaik et al. (2005) as this study could only find some evidence for a link between autonomy, 
and performance. However, this survey contributes by investigating ‘changes’ in network relationships. We, 
therefore, recommend future survey base on other samples that test the effects of changes. Finally, the 
survey confirms the need and the applicability of the framework developed by Giroud & Scott-Kennel 
(2009) where number, scope and intensity of network relationships affect the quality of these network 
relationships. Our survey does not address learning processes but increased performance is a possible 
outcome of increased learning effects.  
A further question that remains is whether autonomy is an obstacle to achieve overlapping network effects 
between intra- and inter-organizational networks. The question is whether increased subsidiary autonomy 
complicates the subsidiary to benefit from external and internal knowledge sources. Future research may 
reveal whether autonomy disconnects the subsidiary from its MNC contexts, and if this creates stickiness in 
knowledge transfers. By this we questions Kogut and Zander’s (1992) seminal contribution of the firms’ 
combinative capabilities. Furthermore, if increased autonomy facilitates entrepreneurial activities that in 
the end turn the subsidiary into a centre of excellence, this specialization, for example within a technology, 
might decrease the need for tapping into intra-organizational knowledge sources (Frost, 2001). From a 
conceptual point of view, future research, we propose, must investigate the effects of autonomy on 
network positions, transfers, and network relationships.   
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Figure 1: Conceptual Model 
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Table 1: Descriptive data 
Home Country Activity  Miscellaneous 
Germany (19) Production (25.6) Age (19.6 years) 
Netherlands (15) Sales (42.6)  Greenfield (56) 
Sweden (13) Services (17.9) Acquisition (37) 
Switzerland (8) R&D (3.3) Joint Venture (7) 
US (6) Other (10.4) FS/TS (23.8) 
Japan (6)  # employees (121) 
France (5)  HCN (77) 
Denmark (5)  PCN (19) 
UK (3)  TCN (3) 
Other (20)   
All figures are percentages, except age and # employees. Activity is measured as the proportion of the workforce in relation to the 
different types of activity. Greenfield, acquisition and joint venture refers to entry mode. FS/TS = foreign sales/total sales. HCN = 
subsidiary managed by a host country national. PCN= parent company national. TCN=third country national.  
 
Table 2: Composite Reliabilities, Cronbach Alphas and R squares 
 Composite  
Reliabliity 
Cronbachs  
Alphas 
R squares 
Autonomy 0.94 0.93 - 
Inter-organizational Networks 0.84 0.79 0.16 
Intra-organizational Networks 0.87 0.82 0.20 
Performance 0.84 0.75 0.19 
Composite should be above 0.70 for each construct (Fornell and Larcker, 1981). Cronbach alpha values should be above 0.70 
(Hulland, 1989). When using PLS technique, one variable is ‘locked’ and R-squares are reported in relation to this variable.  
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Table 3: PLS test  
 Sample mean Standard deviation t-statistics 
H1: inter-performance 
 
0.40 0.07 7.24*** 
(5.32)*** 
H2: Intra-performance 
 
 0.09 0.07 1.36 
(1.81)* 
H3: Inter-Intra 
 
0.49 0.07 7.06*** 
(6.80)*** 
H4: autonomy-performance 
 
0.23 0.07 3.16*** 
(1.00) 
H5: autonomy – inter 
 
0.40 0.06 6.21*** 
(5.19)*** 
H6: autonomy-intra 
 
- 0.11 0.06 1.31 
(1.77)* 
T values in parentheses are without controls  
 
